How Gender Became a Political Weapon for the Far Right

This is a guest post by Maria Barbu, author of The Politicization of Gender

In 2016, the election of Donald Trump did more than disrupt American electoral politics. It redefined the place of gender in nationalist discourse.        

Just weeks before Americans went to the polls, a recording surfaced of the presidential candidate bragging about sexual assault (1), and only months earlier, during the final debate, he had dismissed Hillary Clinton as ‘such a nasty woman’ (2).      

For decades, controversies of this magnitude would have disqualified a candidate. In this case, however, they energised a political base, entering a media feedback loop in which the remarks were widely embraced and reframed as entertainment by his supporters. Over time, they became part of the campaign’s spectacle, as misogyny folded into a broader narrative about reclaiming national strength and rejecting liberal ‘political correctness’.     

The 2022 overturning of Roe v. Wade (3) made clear that this transformation was not solely rhetorical. What had begun as mobilising discourse hardened into institutional change. Constitutional protections were rolled back, and the relationship between the state and the body was fundamentally redefined. In this sense, the Trump presidency did not invent the politicisation of gender, but it brought it from the margins to the centre of political power. And this is not just an American story.   

In Europe, gender has become one of the most effective mobilising frames for far-right actors. The rhetoric may differ from country to country, but the political logic behind it remains strikingly similar.  In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s government removed gender studies from accredited university programmes and introduced ‘child protection’ laws targeting LGBTQ visibility (4, 5). In Poland, abortion restrictions tightened to near-total prohibition (6). In Italy, Giorgia Meloni rose to power invoking the triad of ‘God, nation, family’ (7). And in France, masculinist movements are growing, driven by the spread of online communities that promote male supremacy and hostile sexism (8, 9).   

This is only a glimpse of a much larger trend, one that is shaped by a series of geopolitical and economic crises.  

Over the past two decades, Europe has seen successive waves of migration from the Middle East and Africa, many driven by conflicts such as the Syrian Civil War. Migration peaked during the 2015 European migrant crisis, when more than one million refugees arrived, mostly from Syria, as well as Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea (10, 11). The crisis unfolded amid growing anti-Muslim sentiment and security fears, influenced by the enduring effects of the September 11 attacks and subsequent terrorist incidents worldwide (12, 13).      

At the same time, the 2008 global financial crisis brought rising unemployment and austerity measures across much of the continent, increasing pressure on jobs and public resources (14). In this climate of uncertainty, immigration moved to the forefront of political debate. Anti-EU sentiment also intensified, fuelled in part by public frustration with the scope and volume of laws enacted by the European Union that member states are required to implement (15).    

Together, these dynamics have contributed to the rise of right-wing political parties, many of which oppose supranational integration and challenge the political cohesion of the European Union. It’s important to note that European political discourse tends to differ from that in the United States. While immigration is central to the U.S. national story, many European countries have defined belonging through language, ancestry and long-standing cultural traditions. Such understandings of national identity shape how social change, especially migration, is perceived.           

Demographic trends have made this political conversation even more urgent. Europe’s ageing population has sparked concern that traditional ways of life and social norms could be lost, amplifying the ‘Great Replacement’ theory, a far-right concept claiming that immigration is gradually reducing Europe’s (White) population (16). Simultaneously, public debate emphasises cultural differences between newcomers and host populations, portraying integration as a challenge (17). As a result, nationalist rhetoric can resonate more strongly in Europe than the United States.  

Within this broader nationalist turn, gender became one of the most effective entry points. Debates about immigration and cultural change quickly shifted to questions about women’s rights, religion and the visibility of Muslim communities. The veiling of women, for example, was not treated as a personal or religious choice, but as proof that society was changing. It became a way to discuss women’s place in society, secularism and whether newcomers were adapting to what were considered European ways of life.

In France, this was taken a step further when the French parliament passed the full-face veil ban, which prohibits face coverings in public spaces and prosecutes and/or fines those who do not comply. Women have in fact been convicted and fined for wearing full-face coverings, transforming the veil into a national political issue (18).    

It is within this context that the language of ‘gender ideology’ began to spread. The phrase is deliberately vague, capable of meaning many things at once. In practice, it functions less as a precise concept than as a political tool. It allows far-right actors to bring together groups that might otherwise disagree: religious conservatives concerned about family values, secular nationalists worried about demographic decline and voters who feel alienated by rapid social change. Under the banner of opposing ‘gender ideology’,feminism, LGBTQ rights and academic research on gender can all be portrayed as symptoms of a deeper moral and cultural crisis.

This framing also allows far-right actors to present themselves as defenders of something larger than policy: the family, the nation and even the civilisation itself. By linking gender equality to narratives of moral decay and cultural decline, they recast political debates as existential struggles. Protecting children, safeguarding tradition and preserving national sovereignty become central themes. In this way, gender politics serves as a powerful lever for advancing nationalist agendas.  

In my recent monograph on the politicisation of gender by far-right movements in Europe, I argue that this strategy is not confined to any single country. It is part of a wider political network. The language of ‘gender ideology’, the rhetoric of protecting children and the warnings about cultural decline circulate across borders. Similar talking points appear in political speeches, activist campaigns and media debates from Washington to Budapest, Warsaw and Rome. These movements learn from one another, borrow strategies and reinforce a shared narrative about the supposed dangers of liberal social change.

This transnational dimension helps explain why the politicisation of gender has become so influential in contemporary politics. Gender debates appear less controversial than direct attacks on democratic institutions. Yet, they can open the door to broader challenges to pluralism and liberal norms. Campaigns against gender studies, LGBTQ rights or reproductive freedom precede wider efforts to weaken judicial independence, restrict civil society or control the media.

The stakes, therefore, extend far beyond questions of gender policy alone. When debates about equality are reframed as existential threats to the nation, the boundaries of democracy itself begin to shift. What may seem like a dispute over culture or tradition can quickly turn into a question of who is considered a ‘legitimate’ member of society.

If gender can be politicised so effectively, the question we must ask is not only why this strategy works, but what it reveals about the current vulnerabilities of liberal democracy.  

References:

1.   https://19thnews.org/2024/11/gen-z-access-hollywood-tiktok-trump/
2.   https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/19/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-nasty-woman
3.   https://reproductiverights.org/resources/roe-v-wade/
4.   https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlg/2019/01/the-hungarian-ban-on-gender-studies-and-its-implications-for-democratic-freedom/#:~:text=On%20October%2012%2C%202018%2C%20the,than%20most%20Americans%20may%20think.
5.   https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/775839/EPRS_BRI%282025%29775839_EN.pdf#:~:text=The%20Amendment%20changes%20multiple%20articles%20in%20the,the%20exception%20of%20the%20right%20to%20life.
6.   https://www.echr.coe.int/w/judgment-concerning-poland-7
7.   https://cne.news/article/3400-why-giorgia-meloni-fights-for-the-family
8.   https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20260122-france-urged-to-act-as-masculinism-is-flagged-as-security-threat
9.   https://www.haut-conseil-egalite.gouv.fr/rapport-2026-sur-letat-des-lieux-du-sexisme-en-france-la-menace-masculiniste
10. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe%E2%80%99s-migration-crisis-context-why-now-and-what-next
11. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10118136/
12. https://www.rcc.int/swp/news/55/46-years-of-terrorist-attacks-in-europe-visualized
13. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/islamophobia-europe
14. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/642253/EPRS_BRI%282019%29642253_EN.pdf
15. https://repository.uclawsf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1897&context=hastings_international_comparative_law_review
16. https://globalextremism.org/the-great-replacement/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=17354568434&gbraid=0AAAAAoMlu7DnTQaAqu9VxhQK80h1oU8oS&gclid=Cj0KCQjwve7NBhC-ARIsALZy9HWxPXL1tsSKw0e40ds7dz3gOaifXNjL3rmCzGPTEeo8TQTPxY8JTIYaAh0jEALw_wcB
17. https://bpr.studentorg.berkeley.edu/2022/12/09/what-is-driving-the-rise-of-anti-immigration-sentiment-in-europe/
18. https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/10/1023872