The warlike king who died in his bed

This is an author interview by Dylan Motin, author of How Louis XIV Survived His Hegemonic Bid

Q1. Why a book about Louis XIV and not any other king?

Louis XIV’s France belonged in a rare category of states. Not only was it a great power but also what international relations scholars like to call a potential hegemon. Potential hegemons are states that commandeer military capabilities largely superior to those of any power in their regional neighbourhood. Such states are generally discontent with the status quo and seek to acquire more resources and influence to maximise their power and security. If left unbalanced, they could turn strong enough to dominate their entire corner of the world, becoming an actual regional hegemon.

By the late-seventeenth century, France fielded the largest standing army in Europe by far. Moreover, the force was competent and well-trained and supported by the country’s massive population and agricultural economy. Hence, Ludovician France possessed the latent and actual military power to overwhelm any single rival, placing it alongside other historical potential regional hegemons such as Habsburg Spain, Napoleonic France, Imperial and Nazi Germany, Shōwa Japan and the Soviet Union, as well as current-day China and Russia.

Q2. Why did Louis XIV’s policies provoke so much opposition and wars?

A potential hegemon elicits an intense fear response among others. This state is indeed strong enough to threaten the survival of many of its neighbours and conquer large swaths of land and would menace the autonomy and sovereignty of the others were it to reach hegemony. Hence, Louis XIV’s military preponderance inevitably inaugurated a hair-trigger power competition across Europe, leading to a series of countervailing coalitions. Every time Louis looked like he was reaching European mastery, neighbours such as England, the Netherlands, Austria and Spain fought long and desperate wars to stop him: the Dutch War (1672–1678), the War of the League of Augsburg (1688–1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1713).

Q3. If he failed to achieve hegemony, how can we say he ‘survived’ his hegemonic bid?

Louis XIV emerged from three massive, draining wars still in possession of most of France’s core territories and with his dynasty intact, something not all failed hegemons can claim. His survival depended on his ability to shift strategy, moving from aggressive expansionism to calculated retrenchment, utilising diplomacy to break up coalitions and accepting limited gains to preserve long-term security.

Q4. In what way does your book add to realist theory?

It adds to realist theory by showing that a potential hegemon can survive its bid for hegemony unscathed. Indeed, it may appear at first glance that potential hegemons always fail spectacularly, oftentimes ending up in a weaker position than when they initiated their hegemonic bid. Think of the state in which Napoleon left France or Hitler left Germany.

However, in contrast to Nazi Germany or Napoleonic France and others, whose harsh demands in peace talks, or the absence of peace talks altogether, marked a leap towards hegemony and thus unified their enemies, Louis XIV often offered generous, status quo ante settlements when victory was elusive. This mix of attractive diplomatic concessions and France’s still intact gigantic military capabilities reassured adversaries that the European balance of power would survive, encouraging them to accept peace rather than continue costly and uncertain wars. This insight extends realist theory by highlighting that moderation in peace terms can allow a potential hegemon to exit losing general wars. Hence, it shows that potential hegemons are not destined to defeat and collapse, but can use adept diplomatic strategies to survive.

A secondary point is that the book tests realist claims against the strategic behaviour of early modern France and its neighbours, rather than the usual nineteenth- to twentieth-century cases. Hence, it is a case study of an era often overlooked by scholarship, therefore broadening the empirical base of realist theory.

Q5. What makes Louis XIV unique compared to a Napoleon or a Wilhelm II?

Louis XIV’s uniqueness compared to other leaders of potential hegemons lies in his personal background, formation and governing outlook. His political education was guided by Cardinal Mazarin, a master of diplomatic craft. He acknowledged that European states would resist his superior power and found strategies that took that reality into account. He was less inclined towards the gambler’s brinkmanship that characterised Napoleon’s and Wilhelm’s decision-making, preferring calculated campaigns aligned with France’s actual means. In short, his background and beliefs made him wiser.

Q6. Are there lessons in your book for modern leaders?

There are parallels between Louis XIV’s experience and the challenges facing the contemporary great powers, namely Russia, China and the United States. Similar to Louis XIV’s France, Russia and China are potential regional hegemons whose military capabilities alarm neighbours and provoke counterbalancing coalitions. If a general war breaks out, Louis’s lesson is that a potential hegemon should combine credible military strength with restraint in war aims and moderation in peace terms if it wants to exit the conflict diplomatically. Such moderation can prevent the emergence of unified, persistent opposition of the kind that doomed other revisionist powers, such as Napoleonic France or Wilhelmine Germany. Meanwhile, the United States, too, should be aware of the Ludovician experience, as it offers insights into how Moscow or Beijing (and U.S. allies in Asia and Europe) may think about war termination.